How it works
The fine print, which for once is the good part.
Five lifecycle states, five things no policy can ever grant, and a frank comparison with the identity platform you already have. Read it slowly. Nothing here is implied.
The consent lifecycle
Five states. None of them implied.
- 01
Propose
One subject drafts a scope set. A proposal grants nothing. It is a workflow, not an entitlement.
- 02
Negotiate
Both sides narrow independently. Anything not explicitly widened stays denied. Silence has never resolved to allow here.
- 03
Affirm
Each party signs with two factors, and the affirmations are timestamped, ageable, and separable from the policy they cover.
- 04
Scene
A time-boxed token is issued against the signed policy. Checks run per call, not per session — mid-window drift is caught.
- 05
Debrief
The window closes, aftercare opens, and the outcome amends the next proposal. The record is shared; the interpretation is not.
Why the old model fails here
Legacy IAM assumes consent is durable. It has never been durable.
Typical identity platform
- Consent captured once, at install, in a modal nobody read
- Revocation goes through an admin, who logs a ticket, who asks why
- Permissions are permanent until someone remembers to remove them
- Access is granted to a role, which is inherited, which is forever
- The audit trail records what you did, and never whether you wanted to
iamsec
- Consent captured per scope, per window, twice — in writing and out loud
- Revocation is a single call, by any party, with no reason and no approver
- Permissions expire by default. Nothing outlives its window
- Access is granted to a person, in a context, and never inherits
- The audit trail records the affirmation, its age, and its withdrawal
Immutable denies
Five resources no policy in any plan can grant.
These are not community guidelines and not a moderation policy. They are deny statements evaluated before any allow, compiled into the engine, and byte-identical on a free account and an on-prem Enterprise install. You can verify that without trusting us, which is rather the point of a policy engine.
Read the evaluation orderdeny { action: "*", resource: "consent:ongoing" }Consent is not a one-time grant and cannot be stored, prepaid, or inherited.
deny { action: "*", resource: "capacity:sober" }A subject under the influence cannot be an affirming party. No exceptions, no waivers.
deny { action: "*", resource: "identity:forge" }Misrepresenting who you are voids every policy signed under that identity, retroactively.
deny { action: "*", resource: "body:permanent" }Anything irreversible is out of scope for every plan, forever, including Enterprise.
deny { action: "*", resource: "revocation:conditional" }Revocation may never be made conditional, delayed, penalised, or require a reason.
Asked, repeatedly
Yes, we know how the domain reads.
Is this a dating site?
No. We have no feed, no matching, no discovery, and no way to message anyone. There is no one here to meet. iamsec is an access-management control plane, and the only relationship it mediates is between a subject and a permission.
Is this actually about identity and access management?
Yes, uncomfortably so. Scoped grants, least privilege, short-lived tokens, step-up authentication, deny precedence, continuous re-authorisation and instant global revocation are all real IAM primitives. We took the vocabulary for consent from the people who had to invent it first, because enterprise security was behind on it.
Can my partner read my audit log?
Only the events your shared policy exposed, and only the fields you both agreed to. Everything else is redacted to you alone — including your hard limits, which are not a disclosure, they are a deny rule.
What happens if someone ignores the safeword?
The session is already over: every token was invalidated in under a millisecond, before the second word landed. Technically they are now operating with no credentials against a closed session. Socially, they are out. Community enforcement is a plan feature, and we are not subtle about which plan.
Do you store the content of a negotiation?
We store scope identifiers, effects, timestamps and signatures. We do not store intent, narrative, or anything a subpoena could make cute. End-to-end policy encryption is on Enterprise, and the key never touches our side of the wire.
Is the name a pun?
The domain says exactly what you think it says. We considered being tasteful about it and concluded that a control plane for consent is the least embarrassing place to put that joke. Security is attractive. That is the whole brand thesis, and it is also correct.
Read enough? Draft one.
Five minutes to a signed scope set. Nothing is granted until both of you say so.